

Modern iOS Pentesting:

No Jailbreak Needed


presented by Noah Farmer, Senior AppSec Engineer at Dvuln

Some stuff you'll probably recognise



JailbreakMe (2011) - iOS 4

@comex




redsn0w (2012) - iOS 4 - 6

iPhone Dev-Team

Why did *most* people jailbreak?

- Custom themes (changing the look of the entire device)
- Super cool tweaks (remember Barrel/Cylinder??)
- Carrier unlocking



So.. what got *me* into jailbreaking?

- Had a Minecraft Pocket Edition server shared with classmates in year 5
- Annoyed with being locked in survival mode, wanted free diamonds
- Did some Googling...




Fast forward to today...

- Here I am working in cybersecurity, often tasked with pentesting mobile applications

MASTG

Mobile Application Security
Testing Guide



My toolsuite

objection - Runtime Mobile Exploration

`objection` is a runtime mobile exploration toolkit, powered by [Frida](#), built to help you assess the security posture of your mobile applications, without needing a jailbreak.

twitter [@leonjza](#) pyPI package [1.11.0](#) Black Hat Arsenal [Europe 2017](#) Black Hat Arsenal [USA 2019](#)

- Supports both iOS and Android.
- Inspect and interact with container file systems.
- Bypass SSL pinning.
- Dump keychains.
- Perform memory related tasks, such as dumping & patching.
- Explore and manipulate objects on the heap.
- And much, much [more...](#)




OBJECTION
RUNTIME
MOBILE
EXPLORATION
[GIT.ID/OBJECTION](#)

Screenshots are available in the [wiki](#).

FRIDA

These help to cover pretty much every MASTG checklist item, and more...

Installing was pretty simple...



```
[noahfarmer@Noahs-MacBook-Pro no-jailbreak-required % objection -g com.cyn8.modernios explore
Checking for a newer version of objection...
Using USB device `iPhone`
Agent injected and responds ok!
```



Runtime Mobile Exploration
by: @leonjza from @sensepost

```
[tab] for command suggestions
com.cyn8.modernios on (iPhone: 17.6.1) [usb] #
```

Ready to test!

...but now?



r/jailbreak • 6 mo. ago
Glum-Substance-3356

Ho

Disc



r/jailbreak • 7 days ago
Puzzleheaded-Land-56

Jailbreaking is dead and you know it

Discussion

MOBILE

Is iPhone jailbreaking community looks like in 2023

Everyone wanted to jailbreak their iPhone in the 2010s, so why has the hype died down?

By Calvin Wankhede • April 13, 2023



bcredeur97 • 1y ago

Game of cat and mouse, but the cat won

 10   Reply  Award  Share ...

/r/jailbreak • 1 yr. ago
lightOwlEyes

give up? Iphone 13 plus ios 16

Discussion


 bscribe

 8   Reply ...

 **Nonja999** OP • 3h ago

Unfortunately,
jailbreaking has lost its community.

Google Trends data for "iOS Jailbreaking" shows a pretty obvious decline... why?




Apple's security bounties are among some of the highest in the industry

Device : user-ins	Network attack without user interaction	Zero-click radio to kernel with physical proximity	\$5,000 – \$500,000	▼	
		Zero-click unauthorized access to sensitive data	\$5,000 – \$500,000	▼	▼
		Zero-click kernel code execution with persistence and kernel PAC bypass	\$100,000 - \$1,000,000	▼	▼

Example: CVE-2024-23208

- Affected iOS (iPad/iPhone), macOS, tvOS, and watchOS
- Allows arbitrary code execution with kernel privileges.. also known as a **jailbreak**
- Submitted to Apple, and patched in iOS 17.3 :(



The image is a screenshot of a web browser window displaying a support article from Apple. The address bar shows 'support.apple.com'. The article title is 'Kernel'. The text describes the affected devices, the impact of the vulnerability, the description of the issue, and the CVE details.

Kernel

Available for: iPhone XS and later, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 2nd generation and later, iPad Pro 10.5-inch, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd generation and later, iPad 6th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th generation and later

Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel privileges


Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.

CVE-2024-23208: fmyy(@binary_fmyy) and lime From TIANGONG Team of Legendsec at QI-ANXIN Group

Tweaks are now Features

- Vmoji by @vintendo became "Emoji" in iOS 5
- SBSettings by @BigBoss became "Control Center" in iOS 7
- StickerMe by Alexander Laurus became "Stickers" in iOS 10
- Noctis by @LaughingQuoll became "Dark Mode" in iOS 13

...you get the point



Yes, it's still a thing. But...

Here's where your pentesting devices are coming from...

The image displays three overlapping Facebook Marketplace listings for iPhones, illustrating sources for pentesting devices.

Left Listing: An iPhone 8 64GB Gold Good Condition Warranty NO SIM LOCK for \$199 in Stretton, QLD. The listing includes a photo of the phone on a stand in a shop, a '2 images' thumbnail, and a 'Deep dive into your Xbox stats today!' banner with a 'LEARN MORE' button.

Middle Listing: An iPhone X_100% Like New for \$280 in Lakemba, NSW. The listing features a photo of the phone in its box, a '7 images' thumbnail, and a 'Deep dive into your Xbox stats today!' banner with a 'LEARN MORE' button.

Right Listing: A partially visible listing for an iPhone X_100% Like New for \$280. It includes a 'Sign in to message' button, a 'Show number' link, and a 'Sign in to make an offer' link.

Even if you had these devices...



Passkey API
iOS 16+




Focus Filters
iOS 16+



SharePlay API
iOS 15+

...just to name a few

The usual setup




iPhone X
running iOS 14.4.1

Can pentest most apps: 

...but not this time

- Contract signed ✓
- Testing dates locked in ✓
- iOS device jailbroken and ready ✓
- No IPA provided (black-box), so we'll install the app from the App Store...



Dead end?

Apple's gift to pentesting: `get_task_allow`

- Special entitlement, which you can enable when signing (or re-signing) an application
- Allows external processes, like a debugger, to attach themselves to the application using a special function called `task_for_pid()`.
- Once attached, we can read/write memory, and inject our own code into the application.


What does this have to do with jailbreaking?

- What's the first thing a jailbreak has to achieve? `tfp0`
- `tfp0` (short for `task_for_pid(0)`), gives you access to read & write memory of the kernel (`pid = 0`)
- If you can read/write the kernel's memory, you have the foundations for a full device jailbreak!

But, we don't need a full-device jailbreak.


If we can re-sign an application with this `get_task_allow` entitlement... we can achieve code execution, memory read/write, and more... just for that single application.

Therefore, this entitlement allows us to gain a "jailbreak-like" state, limited to a single application sandbox.



Not fair, FairPlay!

- Unfortunately, you can't just pull the application, resign it with that entitlement, and go about your day.
- If you did, your app sadly won't open, and you'll be greeted nice little messages like these:



Why does this happen?

- Apple encrypts App Store applications with FairPlay DRM
- When you download from the App Store, the IPA is encrypted with a key tied to your Apple ID
- When re-signing (entitlements or not), you break the digital signature of the IPA, and thus:

```
AppleFairplayTextCrypterSession::fairplayOpen() failed, error -42022
```

No application for you!

Fortunately, all is not lost

- Yes, FairPlay is annoying - but it is crucial for protecting IP
- There are a number of methods to decrypt and remove FairPlay DRM, such as frida-ios-dump, Clutch, FoulDecrypt, and Iridium - all of which require a jailbreak

But wait!

- The app won't run on my jailbroken iOS 14 device
- We need the decrypted IPA to go any further...
- Decrypting requires a jailbreak... are we stuck? No!
- The solution?

Static Decryption!

```
1  extern int mremap_encrypted(caddr_t addr, size_t len,  
2                               uint32_t cryptid, uint32_t cputype,  
3                               uint32_t cpusubtype);
```

Static Decryption

- We use a system function, `mremap_encrypted()`, to decrypt a binary on the disk.
- That means, the app doesn't have to be able to run, and we don't need to dump it from memory.
- All we need is a jailbroken environment to run the function.

So, what does that mean?

To decrypt, all we have to do is:

1. Trick the device into installing the app by changing the minimum required iOS version
2. Use a decryption tool that utilises `mremap_encrypted()` such as Iridium, FlexDecrypt, or FoulDecrypt
3. Profit!

For the sake of simplicity...




██████████-decrypted.ipa

30.18 MB


Jailbreak 2.0 - Adding our entitlements

- Now, we can take the final crucial step, enabling the `get-task-allow` entitlement.
- Fortunately, iOS App Signer (available on GitHub), makes this pretty easy:



Jailbreak 2.0 - Time to hook!

```
[noahfarmer@Noahs-MacBook-Pro no-jailbreak-required % objection -g com.cyn8.modernios explore
Checking for a newer version of objection...
Using USB device `iPhone`
Agent injected and responds ok!
```



Runtime Mobile Exploration
by: @leonjza from @sensepost

```
[tab] for command suggestions
com.cyn8.modernios on (iPhone: 17.6.1) [usb] #
```

We have execution on the latest iOS!

Feels like home :-)

```
[noahfarmer@Noahs-MacBook-Pro no-jailbreak-required % objection -g com.cyn8.modernios explore
Using USB device `iPhone`
Agent injected and responds ok!
```



Runtime Mobile Exploration
by: @leonjza from @sensepost

MASTG covered:

Pentest completed:

```
[tab] for command suggestions
```

```
[com.cyn8.modernios on (iPhone: 17.6.1) [usb] # pwd
Current directory: /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/EB[REDACTED].app
```

```
[com.cyn8.modernios on (iPhone: 17.6.1) [usb] # ls
```

NSFileType	Perms	NSFileProtection	Read	Write	Owner	Group	Size	Creation	Name
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	21.9 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED].png
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	2.0 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED].ng
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	33.3 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Directory	493	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	96.0 B	1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	8.2 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	262.8 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Directory	493	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	128.0 B	1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000	[REDACTED]
Directory	493	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	96.0 B	1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	92.3 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	2.8 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Directory	493	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	128.0 B	1970-01-01 00:00:00 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	241.4 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	9.0 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	262.3 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	9.0 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]
Regular	420	None	True	False	_installld (33)	_installld (33)	225.0 KiB	2024-05-21 08:22:52 +0000	[REDACTED]

Summary

- Black-box pentest, no IPA file given
- Can't use jailbroken device, as app doesn't support it
- Can't use main device, as no jailbreaks existed
- We patched the IPA to install on our older device, even though it wouldn't run
- Used that device to decrypt the IPA
- Resigned the IPA with the get-task-allow entitlement
- Installed it on our main device (iPhone 14 Pro)
- Achieved code execution in our application's sandbox

In closing...

Thanks!

